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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REFORM THE DEED IN 
/\CCORDANCE WITH TIIE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES. 
Respondent asserts that appellants have not established 
by "clear and convincing evidence" that the parties were 
mutually mistaken in the execution and delivery of an instru-
ment at variance with their intent, nor that appellants have 
not been guilty of neglect in the execution of che deed, citing 
the standard set forth in Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 
P. 2d 571, 581 (1950). (Respondent's Brief, p. 11) The Sine 
v. Harper standard was later interpreted and refined by this 
Court, as stated in App2liants' Brief at pp. 15-16, in Naisbitt 
v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620 (1957), as follows: 
All that is required is that evidence exists whereby 
this court can say that the trial judge acted as a 
reasonable man in finding that the proof of the fact 
asserted is greater than a mere preponderance. 6 
Utah 2d at 122, 307 P. 2d at 624. 
Conversely, appellants' burden of "clear and convincing evidence" 
to support reformation of this deed is to demonstrate that 
proof of the facts supporting reformation is greater than a 
"mc•r1' pr(~ponc1cr.1 nc<---", and t_h.-it the: trial court acted unreason-
ably in refusing to fairly consider such proof. 
Respondent first asserts that the erroneous deed descrip-
tion is merely a "latent ambigui~y" which does not require 
' reformation. Yet the trial court already reformed the deed 
hy ·,1,, ftinq the (kc'd rlescripLinn n0rthwa.rd so as to border 
i he c"dqe of u. s. Highway 6 on the south, and, in turn, by 
··11, 'Vl 11q the north line northerly an equal distance· By Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
referring to Exhibit "21", reproduced as Appendix "l" in 
respondent's brief, it is readily apparent that the rectangu-
lar parcel found by the court, bordering along the edge of 
the highway, crosses over and embraces substantial land lying 
north and west of the railroad tracks and right-of-way of 
the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad! Such property was never 
and coulc..; never have been used by appellants and their prede-
cessors in interest for partnership and, later, corporate 
purposes, ahd bears no resemblance whatsoever to the property 
actually intended to be conveyed, and subsequently occupied 
and used by appellants and their predecessors in interest 
• for over twenty (20) years. 
Clearly, therefore, the parties were mutually mistaken~ 
to the description of the property intended to be conveyed. 
In evaluating a claim for reformation of a deed, the controlli 
concern is ~he intention of the parties at the time of coowr 
ance. Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 422 P. 2d 525 (1966); 
23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 159 (1965). Thus, where, by respond-
ent's representations, even though made after the fact, 
to appellants and their predecessors in interest, it is shown 
that respondent intended to convey all the property within 
the yellow lines depicted on Exhibit "21", and that appellant' 
relied on those representations in their acquisition and 
subsequent use and occupation of that property, then such 
intent requires that the deed be reformed to conform thereto. 
Respondent asserts that there is no evidence in Llw re·:· 
· · h 1cnr 1iir·." that Skyline Enterprises, Inc., rather t an respon' 
-2-
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allowed full occupation and use of the disputed property. 
Apparently, respondent has not examined the record carefully. 
His own expert realtor witness, Esbern Baadsgaard, testified 
that the entire property in question was used by appellant 
Gerald Carter and his predecessors in interest, clear back 
to 1954 when operated by Skyline Enterprises, Inc. (Tr., p. 
197, lines 12-28) This fact was confirmed by each of the 
appellants and by their predecessors in interest: Mr. D. Lloyd 
Horlacher (Tr., pp. 220, 226-27), Mrs. Elda Horlacher (Tr., 
pp. 258, 259, 260, 261), Dr. Merrill L. Oldroyd (Tr., p. 
240), Mr. John A. Canto (Tr., pp. 279, 280), and Mr. Gerald 
Carter (Tr., pp. 294, 295, 297, 298, 316-317). Even Dennis 
Prince, one of the original partners in the Skyline Enterprises 
business, paid rent to appellant Gerald Carter for camping 
space in the disputed area (Tr., p. 299), recognizing Carter's 
right, as successor in interest of the business property, to 
occupy the disputed area. 
Respondent further asserts that he did not make the 
boundary representations claimed by appellants. Yet he care-
fully avoids mentioning the fact that in his pleadings, under 
his Third and Fourth Defenses in his Reply to Defendants' 
Counterclaim, he specifically admitted making the aforesaid 
representations, as follows: 
THIRD DEFENSE 
As a separate and affirmative defense, plaintiff 
alleges that any statement or communication made 
by him relative to any land claimed by the defend-
ants within Section 14, Township 10 South, Range 
6 East, Salt Lake Meridian, was true and correct. 
(Emphasis added.) 
-3-
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FOURTH DEFENSE 
As c;t ~eparate and further affirmative defense; 
plain~if f alleges that any statement or commuriit~­
tion made by him relative to any land claimed by 
defendants within Section 14, Township 10 Southi 
Range 6 East, Salt Lake Meridian was made in g~b~ 
faith and was made with probable ~ ~oelJ.e ;i.ng 
~uth of any statement or communication mad~. 
(Emphasis added.) - --
Respondent is bound by these express admissions lh hill 
pleadings, and is es topped from denying that such :tepteserila-
tions were made. Months later, at time of trial, fdt: re~pond· 
ent to sudaenly change his mind and decide that he dld not 
make such fepresentations after all, in no way affedl~ ttta 
binding adiliissions previously made in his own pleadihgs. 
These admissions by respondent, coupled with the testirnon> 
about the representations made by him to Mr. Horiacihei' (tr., p: 
207, 215), Mrs. Horlacher (Tr., pp. 260-261), Dr. dltlrbyd 
(Tr., pp. 238-239), and Gerald Carter (Tr., pp. 30tl-304) t con· 
elusively ~stablish the reality of the representatiohs, t~ 
reliance of the parties thereon, and the intention of the 
parties in contracting with respect to the property. In com· 
paring this overwhelming weight of the evidence to respondent' 
lame attemt>t to deny what he had already admitted in his 
pleadings, the trial court clearly erred in not firtdirtg clear , 
and convincing evidence to support reformation of the deed. 
In~tead, the trial court sustained objections tb testi· 
many about those representations on the ground that, cit th~ 
time of sale, respondent did not own the land. (Tr. , P · 2081 
There appears to be no legal authority for the proposition 
1 
only a landowner can make competent representations with 
-4-
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' 
respect to boundary lines of property, nor that such repre-
sentations can be made by a granter only to his immediate 
grantee, and respondent cites none in his brief. Respondent 
was a previous owner of the property at the time he made 
the representations, and was, at the time, the owner of 
the contiguous tract, and he admitted in his own pleadings 
the truth and accuracy of the representations made. 
The trial court did allow similar testimony to subse-
quently come in, but with tongue in cheek, and was obviously 
still of the same opinion expressed in its prior ruling. 
(Tr., pp. 214, 237, 261) The court was clearly influenced by 
its earlier ruling, and persisted in its reasoning expressed 
therein. By its obvious refusal to fairly consider this 
clearly competent evidence in its judgment, the court committed 
reversible error. 
In swn, the testimony of appellants clearly prepon-
derates andthere is no credible evidence to sustain the de-
cision of the trial court supporting the respondent's 
position in this case. Appellants are fully aware of their 
responsibility to establish error made by the trial court, 
and respectfully submit that the refusal by the trial court 
to fairly consider the great preponderance of testimony 
concerning respondent's representations, and its adherence to 
a false premise, unsupported by legal authority, so colored 
the court's decision as to amount to prejudicial and 
reversible error. 
Respondent also asserts that appellants and their pred-
-5-
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ecessors ih interest were "inexcusably negligenth wilh res~~ 
to the erroneous deed description. Yet respondent himself 
accepted the faulty description both as granter and as one 
of the grahtees in the original deed to the partnership in 
1954. None of the parties involved ever used and occupied 
the land across the highway on the south or across the railro' 
tracks on the north and west which was purported to be conve1, 
by that ertoneous description. Rather, appellants ahd their 
predecessots in interest relied upon the representations 
made to thl:!l:n by respondent concerning the actual bdundaries 
of the property, and used and occupied the land up tb thos~ 
boundaries• They, as lay grantees, were ~ given any 
reason to doubt the accuracy of the deeded description, parti: 
larly wherE! no survey hau ever established whether the metes 
and bounds tlesoription conformed to the physical boundary 
lines actually occupied and claimed by them. 
Inexctisable neglect is a question to be deterntinE!d by 
the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Geo~ 
v. Fritsch Loan & Trust Co., 69 Utah 460; 256 P. 400 (1921); 
Peterson v.• Eldredge, 122 Utah 96, 246 P. 2d 886 (1952); ~' 
Annot. I Bl A.L.R. 2d 7 I 31-33 (1962). The trial court made 
no such fittding, and there certainly was no prejudice to 
the respondent, where he himself, as grantee, accepted the 
faulty description prepared by himself as granter. H any 
negligence was present, it was attributable to respondent. 
Where he clearly intended, as evidenced by the representatlor' 
he admittedly made, to convey all the property bounded with:' 
-6-
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• 
the yellow lines depicted on Exhibit "21", and appellants and 
their predecessors in interest, in reliance thereon, subse-
quently used and occupied the entire disputed area, the deed 
should be reformed to conform to the intention of the parties. 
-7-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A BOUNDARY LI:; 
ESTABPSHED BY ACQUIESCENCE ALONG THE NATURAL ANb MAN-. 
MADE BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY. 
Respondent asserts that appellants have failed td estai. 
lish the presumption that a binding boundary line by acqui-
escence existed between the parties. On the contrary 1 appel· 
lants have clearly shown, by the great weight of i:he evid~nc: 
in this case, that such a boundary by acquiescence exist~, 
and have firmly established that boundary on all four 
required pbints: 
First, with respect to a visible line, the foregoing 
discussion under Point I, supra.- is pertinent to this issue. 
Despite respondent's claim that no such evidence is ~res~t 
therein, the record clearly establishes that ever since 
May 22, 1954, when respondent conveyed the property to hi~ 
self and others as partners doing business under the name ani 
style of Skyline Enterprises, he and his colleagues as gtaW 
and appellants as their successors in interest, for a period 
of more than twenty (20) consecutive years, have occupied, 
claimed, ahd operated the entire property up to the physical 
boundaries delineated by the yellow lines on Exhibit 11 21"· 
This fact is conclusively demonstrated by the testimony of 
· (T p 191: Mr. Baadsgaard, respondent's own expert witness r · 1 • 
Mr. Horlacher (Tr., pp. 220, 226-27), Mrs. Horlacher (Tr., 
pp. 258, 259, 260, 261), D;r:. Oldroyd (Tr., p. 240), appellant 
John A. Cahto (Tr., pp. 279, 280), and appellant Gerald cart• 
(Tr., pp. 294, 29'>, 2'>7, 298, 299, 316-317). 
-8-
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The boundaries of the property, as represented by respond-
ent to Mr. and Mrs. Horlacher, Dr. Oldroyd, and Mr. Carter, 
and expressly admitted by respondent in his pleadings, as 
outlined under Point ~, supra, correspond to the physical 
contours of the land, the "visihle line" following the natural 
and man-made boundaries of the property: i.e., the Denver 
and Rio Grande Railroad right-of-way on the north, an existing 
fence line adjacent to Tie-Fork Creek on the east, U.S. High-
way 6 on the south, and the west boundary of a pond on .the 
west. This area, clearly delineated by visible natural and 
man-made monuments, fences, etc., was the area actually 
occupied and used by appellants and their predecessors in 
interest, including the plaintiff, through the partnership 
and corporation in which he was an owner, rather than the 
actual deeded description, a large portion of which includes 
the highway, or the parcel adjusted to border on the edge 
of the highway, a large portion of which then crosses over 
the railroad tracks themselves. Such a parcel bears no 
resemblance to the property actually used and claimed by 
appellants and their predecessors in interest. 
Respondent alleges that the fence along Tie-Fork Creek 
was used for livestock control. Respondent, however, since 
the original conveyance to the partnership, Skyline Enter-
prises, on May 22, 1954, has always maintained and represented 
the fence as being the boundary line between the parties. 
(Tr., pp. 207, 215, 238-39, 260-61,, 300-304) As such, the 
~~se comes squarely within the rule set forth by this Court 
-9-
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• 
in Baum v. Defa, 525 P. 2d 725 (Utah 1974), as follows: 
... On the other hand, if the property on either side 
of such a fence is conveyed to separate parties, so 
that there comes into being separate ownership of 
the tracts on either side, and the circumstances 
are such that the parties should reasonably be 
asswrt~d to accept the fence as the boundary between 
their properties, then from that time on, the time I 
durirl9 which the fence continues to exist, should 
be regarded as going toward fulfilling the time 
requirement for the establishment of a boundary by 
acquiescence ...• 525 P. 2d at 727. 
Respdndent asserts that he did not acquiesce irt the 1~ 
as a boundary. Respondent, however, overlooks the represent! 
tions he admittedly made, discussed previously under Point 1, 
supra. Furthermore, he never objected to the occupation and 
control of the disputed property by appellants and their 
predecessors in interest. (Tr., pp. 220, 305) Hie asked 
permission of appellant Gerald Carter to spray weeds on t~ 
property. (Tr., pp. 303-304) After his conveyance to app~l· 
lants' pred~cessors in interest, respondent moved his small 
family cabin from the disputed area, across Tie-Fdtk Creek, 
onto respondent's own property which he still retained. l~r, 
pp. 131, 132; 298) When he saw appellant John A. Cahto gradi'.: 
and leveling the disputed area, respondent never objected to 
Canto performing the work, but merely waved as he passed bY· 
(Tr., pp. 271-74) Finally, when appellants' possession sur· 
vey indicatl3d that the boundary of the property might extend 
east of Tie-Fork Creek, respondent told appellant Gerald 
Carter that he had ~lwAys undrrstnod the rAst boundaty of~ 
property to be Tie-Fork Creek, and advised Mr. Carter to 
go to a stationery store across the street from the lltRh C'' 
-10-
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' 
Courthouse, and get some quit-claim deeds, and respondent 
would straighten out the description. (Tr., pp. 301-302) 
Respondent further alleges that acquiescence in the 
boundary line has not been shown for the requisite number of 
years. The "long period of time" is generally equated with 
the prescriptive period of twenty (20) years. Nevertheless, 
as this Court declared in Baum v. Defa, supra, " .•• [T]his 
may depend upon the circumstances of the individual case." 
525 P. 2d at 727; see also, King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 
378 P. 2d 893 (1963), and Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 
239 P. 2d 205 (1951). See generally, Annot., 69 A.L.R. 
1430 (1930), supplemented in Annot., 113 A.L.R. 421 (1938). 
In this case, at any rate, the acquiescence has actually 
endured for more than twenty (20) years, since 1954, when 
respondent, wearing two hats as both grantor in the original 
deed and also as one of the grantees therein, in conjunction 
with the partnership and corporation, exercised full control 
over the entire property up to the boundary lines depicted 
by the yellow lines on Exhibit "21". Since 1963, when Dr. 
Oldroyd became the sole owner of Skyview Enterprises, Inc., 
and then sold the property to the Horlachers, it has been 
exclusively occupied and controlled by appellants and their 
predecessors in interest, up to the commencement of this 
proceeding. All of the elements of a boundary by acquiescence, 
including the requisite period of ti.me, have been fully met. 
Respondent emphasizes that appellant Gerald Carter, once 
he discovered the discrepancy between the erroneous deed de-
-11-
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-scription ahd the land he actually occupird and used, att~~ 
to buy that land from respondent. Mr. Carter, being unaware 
of his legal claim thereto on the basis of boundary by ac~~ 
cence, made the gesture as an attempt to placate responde~, 
testifying that he did so "as a matter of settling any 1~~ 
action ... n (Tr. I p. 309) 
Respondent further asserts that he used the property 
by parking in the disputed area and holding one family reunic 
there. (Tr., p. 318) Appellant Gerald Carter, after an 
acquaintance with the property for over twenty (~) years, 
testified that he had never observed a well or any evidence 
thereof on the property. (Tr., p. 318) Respondent himself, 
contrary to his representations in Respondent's Brief 1 pp. 
and 22, testified that he never participated in planting 
grass on the property (Tr., p. 149, line 16 et ~-), such 
planting and re-seeding actually having been performed by 
the Horlachers (Tr., pp. 220-21, 297, 298) and Gerald Carter 
(Tr., pp. 304-305). 
Other than the courtesy shown to an acquaintance and 
former landowner in allowing respondent to park on the proper:i 
one time, the other alleged uses (~, granting a pole-lihc 
easement and excepting the property in another, separate cleed, 
by respondent are mitigated by the erroneous deed descriptior 
created by respondent himself as grantor in the original deec, 
and in any event are irrelevant in light of the represcn~-
1 inv, 
tions which he admittedly made concerning the boundary · 
This also applies to such assertions as the moving of the 
-1,2-
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toilets, which were moved to allow access for grading (Tr., 
p. 313), and not because of any act on respondent's part. 
In the final analysis, the intention of the parties is 
the controlling consideration in determining boundaries. Losee 
v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 P. 2d 132 (1951). The overwhelm-
ing weight of credible evidence, demonstrated by respondent's 
representations and the parties' subsequent acts in reliance 
thereon, clearly establish all the elements of a boundary by 
acquiescence along the natural and man-made boundary lines 
of the property, represented by the.yellow lines on Exhibit 
"21". 
-13-
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POINT III 
THE TkIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MONEY DAMAGES TO 
RESPONDENT. 
Respondent asserts, in support of his award of money 
damages, that there was no "significant" rebuttal testimony 
on the matter. His derogatory appellation of Mr. John A. 
Canto, a professional earth mover and land leveler, as a 
"cat-skinner" (Respondent's Brief, p. 23), together ~ith ~ 
denigration of Mr. Canto's testimony, again indicate his fa!: 
ure to carefully examine the record. Appellants have no nee' 
to resort to name-calling in order to show that there was, 
indeed, "significant" rebuttal testimony on this issue. 
Mr. D. Lloyd Horlacher, one of appellants' p:teciecessot~ 
in interest, testified that, when he came into possessionof 
the property, there was a "big field of wild thorn bushes" 
which he was obliged to grade and clear off the property. 
(Tr., pp. 217, 218) In addition to the thorn bushes; the 
disputed area was also covered and "overgrown with weeds". 
(Tr., p. 221) 
Appellant John A. Canto, who has been in the eatth-movi'' 
business for twenty-five years (Tr., p. 276), testified that 
the topsoil in the disputed area was of very poor quaiity 
(Tr., p. 276), and that there was no difference ih the soil 
condition after he performed the grading work. (Tr., P· 271! 
He also testified that little if any dirt was pushed into 
Tie-rork Creek, and that the grading was performed in a~· 
~direction, rather than easterly into Tie-Fork Creek. 
-14-
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pp. 274, 277-78, 284) No one, other than the man who personally 
performed the grading work, was in a better position to authori-
tatively describe how the work was done -- especially not 
an occasional visitor, Grant Williams, whose testimony must 
be viewed in the light of his obvious bias as respondent's 
own brother. 
Respondent alleges that the admission of his unsupported 
and self-serving testimony constituted harmless error. To 
the contrary, the testimony was properly objected to, and its 
admission constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial 
court. 
In Provo River Water Users' Ass'n. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 
93, 133 P. 2d 777 (1943), the Court did say that an owner 
of property is always entitled to testify as to its value, 
and to express an opinion as to its value (in condemnation 
proceedings). However, in Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Steele 
Ranch, 533 P. 2d 888 (Utah 1975), the Court limited that hold-
ing by ruling that such testimony is incompetent unless it 
appears that the owner has a realistic idea of its value. 
This Court definitively set forth its stand on the issue 
in Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Johnson, 550 P. 2d 216 (Utah 1976), 
as follows: 
The case of State v. Larson [54 Wash. 2d 86, 338 
P. 2d 135 (1959)] shows the trend of recent decisions 
and we think it correctly sets forth the law: 
An owner of property may testify as to its 
value, ... upon the asswuption that he is 
particularly familiar with it and, because 
of his ownership, knows of the uses for which 
it is particularly adaptable •... However, 
when, as here, the owner has not used his 
-15-
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• 
intimate experience with and knowledge of 
the land's uses as a basis for determining 
its fair market value, but has obviously 
determined it upon tne application of an 
improper formula, his opinion fails to meet 
the test and, therefore, has no probative 
value. 
Another case in point is that of Commonwealth 1 etc. 
v. Hopson I396 S.W. 2d 805 (Ky. 1965)] which holds: 
The landowner should not be permitted to 
testify as to market values unless he qual-
ifies in accordance with the holding in 
Commonwealth v. Fister I373 S.W. 2d 720 
(Ky. 1963)]. 
~hat case held: "The net effect of odr 
decision on this question is that the owner 
bf real estate shall not be presumed ade-
quately qualified to express an opinion of 
market values by reason of ownership alone." 
Another case of interest on the point is that of 
Rot~e v. Murphy Il98 s.w. 2d 932 (Texas Court of 
civil Appeals 1946)], wherein the court stated: 
Appellant next complains because she was 
hot permitted to testify to the market 
value of the lots in question. Appellant 
did not show herself to be sufficiently 
familiar with the cash market value of 
these lots to qualify her to express an 
opinion as to their value, and therefore 
the court did not err in excluding her 
testimony as to the value of the lots. 
550 p, 2d at 217-218. 
Appellants respectfully submit that, just as in the cu~ 
cited by the Court in Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Johnson, ~· 
there was never any showing that respondent in this case h~ 
any expertise whatsoever with respect to property values or 
other surrounding circumstances, and therefore, he was not 
competent to testify by reason of previous ownership alone. 
~n the Johnson case, supra, the owner testified as to what 
the property was worth to him personally, and this Court 
held the admission of such testimony to be reversible er~t 
-16-
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The basis upon which the owner stated the value of 
the property was not permitted by law. What the 
property is worth to a seller is not a correct 
basis for an opinion [citing United States v. Petty 
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946)], and the motion 
to strike the answer should have been granted. 
550 P. 2d at 217. 
In the present case, as in Johnson, supra, the only evidence 
upon which the court awarded damages was respondent's flat 
assertion as to what the property was worth to him. On the 
basis of Johnson, supra, such award constitutes reversible 
error. See, Burke v. Thomas, 313 P. 2d 1082 (Okla. 1957). 
Respondent asserts that the property is suitable for po-
tential summer homes on half-acre lots (Tr., pp. 104-105}, and 
his expert witness, Mr. Baadsgaard, also made his estimate of 
value upon the same erroneous assumption. Such use is based 
upon a legal impossibility. 
The business property is currently zoned by Utah County 
as T & S-1, Trade and Services. The surrounding area, due to 
watershed considerations, is currently zoned CE-1, Critical 
Environmental. The current uses of the property, ~, motel, 
service station, restaurant, and trailer parking, are all 
specifically permitted by the T & S-1 zoning designation. 
Utah County, Utah Rev. Zoning Ordinance, as amended, § 4-5-8 
( B) and ( C) ( 19 7 6) . 
On the other hand, summer homes are not permitted under 
CE-1 zoning. Id., § 4-5-5 (B) and (C). Even if a variance 
wer0 qranted to change the zoning to CE-2, Critical Environ-
inr~nt zoning which does permit seasonal homes, the miniJTl1.lll) 
lot size requirement thereunder is twenty (~) ~, an 
-17-
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area more than twice the size of the entire property in qttes-
tion. Id.; § 4-5-6 (C) and (DJ; § 4-6-4 (F) (4). 
In Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 
P. 2d 301 (Utah 1975), the defendant builders promised to 
locate plaintiff's home in compliance "with all zoning 0~~ 
nancesand regulations and all building restrictions and 
protective covenants governing said real property." This 
Court found that the performance bargained for (i.e., a home 
with a view of the valley) was legally impossible under 
existing zoning law, and held: 
[Al designer who undertakes to situate proposed 
cohstruction at a particular site, pursuant to 
hi~ plot plan, is required to do so in compliance 
with applicable zoning ordinances and restrictive 
covenants. 538 P. 2d at 308-09. 
There is not one shred of evidence in the record to 
demonstrate that respondent took any of the petition-and-
amendment steps required to obtain a zone change under _!i:.1 
§ 4-1-7, other than "discussing the possibilities of re-
zoning with a local official". (Respondent's Brief, P• 26; 
Tr., p. 132i Such action does not constitute a fortna:l peti-
tion for variance, which could not have been granted anyway, 
under current zoning law, and therefore any use of the prope: 
other than those expressly permitted within the zone; is 
expressly prohibited under § 4-1-11, Utah County, Utah Rev. 
Zoning Ordinance, supra. See, Morgan County v. Stephens,)! 
p. 2d l340 (Utah 1974). Appellants respectfully submit, 
therefore, th~t the award of damages by the trial court, 
based on respondent's testimony of what the property wa~ ~· 
-18-
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' 
to him (i.e., for summer homes), was erroneous on this addi-
tional ground, and that the "highest and best use" upon which 
the award was partly predicated is not permitted by law and 
is therefore invalid. 
Respondent alleges that he has not sought to take ~dvan­
tage of the substantial improvements made on the proper.j by 
appellants and their predecessors in interest. Yet, at the 
same time, he claims trespass by appellants and their pred-
ecessors in interest on the disputed area. If that were true, 
then such supposed trespass dates back to 1963, when the 
~orlachers first came on the property, and graded and removed 
the thorn patch and weeds which infested the area. (Tr., pp. 
217, 218, 221) This principle is explained in 22 Am. Jur. 2d 
Damages § 133 (1965), as follows: "Notice, though, that it 
is the present value of the land in its condition innnediately 
prior to the tort which is important. The court will not 
require the defendant to pay damages based upon a value which 
assumes that the land had been changed (for example, from 
wild to cultivated land) to the most profitable use". 
sis added.) 
(Empha-
Respondent thus appears to want to "have his cake and 
eat it, too". He seeks to expropriate the improvements 
made on the property and enjoy their benefit, and then seek 
damages for the condition of the property immediately before 
and ~fter the grading in 1974, some ten years after the 
ini tia,l improvements were made. ";cf the act of the defendant 
is a benefit to the land and increases its value, the plain-
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tiff cannot enjoy the benefit and at the same time recov~ 
the cost of restoring the land to its former condition." 
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 133 (1965); see also, 22 Arn. Jur. i 
Damages§ 204 (1965). 
R.esporl.dent makes much of the estimate of replacement co; 
which was ignored by the trial court, and for which he cik 
no Utah authority. It should be noted that Mr. Johnson's 
estimate was based on figures supplied by respondent, he 
(Mr. Johnson) never having personally been on the land (Tr., 
pp. 59, 61), and that topsoil was probably availabie int~ 
immediate Vicinity of the property, thus avoiding the length: 
and costly 98 trips alleged by respondent. (Tr., pp. 59-60) 
The testimony of the respondent's brother, Grant Williams, 
was not oniy biased by his relationship, but was addr~ssed 
to the claim that forage for livestock was impaired by the 
grading, and it had nothing to do with its effect on the 
use of said land for summer homes. 
Thus, the before-and-after test was correctly, alth~~ 
erroneously, applied by the trial court. See generall_y, Ahne 
1 A.L.R. 3d 801 (1965). However, if such a test is applicabi 
it should date back to the original alleged trespass, at t~ 
time of the thorn patch, rather than at some later date, 
after respondent has taken advantage of the improvements made 
by appellants and their predecessors in interest on the proP' 
erty. R.espbndent's discussion of punitive damages is ir~W 
Vant, havin9 been ignored by the trial court, and merits iin 
further discussion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully request that the relief sought 
on appeal, set forth in detail in appellants' principal 
brief on file herein, be granted in full, and that the 
decision and judgment of the trial court be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V. PERSHING NELSON 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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